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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i) is the basis of this Court's jurisdiction 
of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is there a legal basis upon which an ex-wife may 
resurrect an alimony award of seven (7) years after the seven years 
has run? 
2. Does the Amendment to UCA Sec. 30-3-5 which became 
effective on May 1, 1995 apply to Plaintiff's Petition for 
additional alimony that was originally filed before May 1, 1995 but 
which was amended after the effective date of the Statutory 
Amendment? 
3. Should the Plaintiff have been barred by the trial court 
from addressing circumstances that allegedly occurred prior to the 
entry of the original Decree of Divorce? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
References to the parties' in this appeal shall be "Lynn", the 
husband, and "Sherrie", the former wife. Also, references herein 
to the transcript of proceedings of the trial court shall be cited 
as R • P • , L • • 
Sherrie filed a second Petition to Modify the Decree of 
Divorce which Decree was originally entered on June 5, 1987. This 
second petition was filed in August of 1994 and was amended in 
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January of 199 6. 
The original Decree awarded Sherrie alimony of $200 per month 
for seven (7) years unless she remarried or other events occurred 
that would, by law, terminate the award earlier. 
Within the originally decreed seven (7) year life of the 
alimony award, Sherrie, pursuant to a Petition to Modi fy the Decree 
and by stipulation by Lynn, was awarded an increase of her alimony 
to $318.00 per month commencing June, 1992. Paragraph 3 of the 
Modified Decree of Divorce states that the award of alimony was to 
terminate in May, 1994. Lynn was also ordered to pay retroactive 
arrearages as a result of the Court's increase of child support and 
alimony and was ordered to discharge the arrearages by paying $lr>u0 
per month after the oldest child attained the age of majority, or 
until July, 1995. Most of the retroactive arrearages represented 
an increase of child support from $500 per month to $1200 per 
month. No request for an extension of the original seven (7) year 
duration of alimony was ever made in this first Petition to Modify. 
In August 1994, some four (4) months after Sherrie's alimony 
had terminated in May of 1994, she again petitioned the Court to 
Modify the Decree and requested additional alimony on a permanent 
basis or until she was able to retrain herself for another 
employment. .One of the reasons she cited for the increases was an 
onset of rheumatoid arthritis. Thereafter, Sherrie amended this 
second Petition to Modify the Decree which Amendment was granted by 
the Court in January, 1996. This Amended Petition alleged new 
facts which accused Lynn of orchestrating t .he origi na 1 < i i ^  rorce in 
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such a manner as to deprive Sherrie of a larger share of the 
marital estate. The Amendment also restated Sherrie's request for 
more alimony. 
At a temporary hearing for alimony, Sherrie was awarded $800 
per month by recommendation of Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett on May 
1, 1995. Said recommendation was objected to by Lynn but was 
affirmed by Judge Kenneth Rigtrup on September 29, 1995. 
Thereafter, Lynn attempted to terminate alimony by a Motion to 
Commissioner Arnett. This Motion alleged that the May 1, 1995 
Amendment to UCA 30-3-5 now prohibited the Court from modifying an 
award alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist 
at the time the Decree was entered. However, Commissioner Arnett 
denied the Motion because the temporary award of alimony was argued 
prior to the effective date of the Amendment of May 1, 1995. 
At trial Lynn presented a Motion in Limine to bar inquiry by 
Sherrie into circumstances and facts that allegedly occurred prior 
to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. Judge Stephen Henriod 
granted Lynn's motion basing his ruling upon res judicata plus the 
failure of Sherrie to fulfill the requirements of Rule 60(b) of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Later in the trial Sherrie admitted that her onset of 
rheumatoid arthritis commenced in May of 1994, some seven (7) years 
after the Decree was entered, the same month her alimony award was 
to terminate. By so testifying Sherrie admitted that her condition 
did not exist at the time the Decree was entered. Nevertheless, 
Sherrie testified that until January of 1995, she worked as a 
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medical assistant up to sixty (60) hours per week at South Valley 
Intermediate Care as the result of her obtaining post divorce 
training and a certificate at the Bryman School in April of 1988. 
Lynn testified that at the time of the last hearing in 1992 of 
Sherriefs request for more alimony that he was earning nearly 
$105,000 per year but that Sherrie and her attorney only asked for 
$318 per month as alimony. R.P.129,L.9-12. Significantly, not only 
did she did not request an extension of the original seven (7) year 
duration of alimony, (R.P.128,L.25 and R.P.63,L.2.) she did not 
allege Lynn had orchestrated events relating to the original 
divorce. 
Furthermore, the amount of the increase was a stipulated and 
settled amount, and, therefore uncontested. 
Lynn also stated his 1992 salary was $105,000 per annum and 
currently totals about $120,000 per year in 1997. 
After the conclusion of the trial the Court, by written 
ruling, dismissed Sherrie's Amended Petition for no cause of action 
reasoning that because of Sherrie•s alimony award, having 
terminated before the present petition was filed, there was no 
legal foundation upon which to base an increase in alimony. The 
Court also ruled that the May 1, 1995 Amendments to UCA Sec.30-3-5 
were applicable to the case but that the ruling would have been the 
same even if the amendments had been held inapplicable. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THERE WAS NO 
LEGAL BASIS TO AWARD SHERRIE AN INCREASE IN ALIMONY. 
Sherrie waited too long to file or an increase of alimony 
since, by virtue of the decree, the alimony ended three (3) months 
before her second petition to modify was filed. 
The case of Cole v. Cole 239 P.2d 615.(Utah 1952) denied the 
ex-wife's request for more alimony that was filed some twelve years 
after the original award ended by its terms. The denial was upheld 
despite the fact that the trial court found a material chance of 
circumstances had occurred. In a separate concurring opinion 
Justice Henriod noted that the only reasonable interpretation of 
the original two years award of alimony was "to fix a maximum two 
year alimony paying period, after which any right to alimony would 
be foreclosed unless one of the parties sought modification of the 
award during such period (emphasis added). Justice Henriod further 
stated that "after the two year period had elapsed the parties were 
in the same position as though alimony had not been awarded, and 
the principal enunciated should control." Cole at P.616. 
In 1992 when Sherrie petitioned for and obtained an increase 
of alimony from $200 per month to $318 per month Lynn was earning 
about $105/000 per year. (R.P.128,L.5 and R.P.69,L.22). 
Interestingly, Sherrie and her attorney not only accepted $318 per 
month as an appropriate increase, but also took the initiative in 
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offering to settle for that amount. R.P.128,L.11,12 & 22. There 
was no allegation by Sherrie that Lynn orchestrated the divorce in 
this first Petiton to Modify that was present in the second 
Petition. It is, therefore, highly questionable that Lynn did 
anything wrong as is alleged in the Amended Petition. 
Furthermore, although there was ample time and opportunity to 
request an extension of the seven (7) year award, Sherrie and her 
attorney failed to do so. R.P.63,L.2. 
The legislature has given an indication of its support of 
Lynn's argument that a recipient of alimony must act during the 
life of the award: UCA 30-3-5(7) (h) imposes a limit upon the 
duration of an alimony award to the term of years of the marriage 
"unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony/ the Court 
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment for a 
longer period of time" (emphasis added). See also Family Law in 
Utah at P.149,150. 
With alimony having ended, the logical conclusion is that Lynn 
and Sherrie became strangers, legally speaking, after May of 1994. 
There was no legal Relationship that existed between them that 
would justify a resurrection of Sherrie's alimony award. 
ARGUMENT 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE AMENDMENTS 
TO UCA 30-3-5 WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE MAY 1, 1995 
WERE APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The second Petition to Modify was filed by Sherrie in August 
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of 1994. The Amended Petition to Modify was granted by Court in 
January, 1996. The Amended Petition raised new allegations 
concerning Lynn's alleged conduct that were not contained in the 
August 1994 Petition nor in the 1992 Petition. Thus, the Court 
ruled that the new amendments to UCA 30-3-5 apply. Therefore, the 
"new" UCA 30-3-5 (7)(g)(ii) provides that "the Court may not modify 
alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the Decree was entered, 
unless the Court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action." 
It is unarguable that Sherrie did not contract rheumatoid 
arthritis until May, 1994. (R.P.37,L.7 and R.P.63,L.7, and R.P.74, 
1.4) some seven (7) years after the entry of the original decree. 
Therefore, Sherrie's affliction did not exist at the time the 
Decree was entered. The question remains, did extenuating 
circumstances exist to justify a modification as required by the 
statute? 
Family Law in Utah/ second edition, by Katherine and Stephen 
Black at P.149 takes the position that "Presumably, the legislature 
decided that subsequent illnesses, accidents, mishaps or bad luck 
should not be the responsibility of the previous spouse without a 
showing of extenuating circumstances justifying imposing the 
responsibility, on the spouse." An extenuating circumstance 
imposing upon an ex-husband to pay alimony that was previously 
waived is illustrated by a situation where a husband, who agreed to 
pay debts of his wife if she agreed to waive alimony "now and 
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forever" and where he later defaults on that agreement, the wife is 
not held to her waiver and she may thereafter receive alimony. 
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 212-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In Sherrie's case, she testified that Lynn did not cause her 
arthritic condition R.P.73,L.22-25 & R.P.74,L.l. Sherrie also had 
not applied for any other employment for over a year prior to the 
trial. (R.P.72,L.22-24). Furthermore, Lynn pays for his adult 
son's schooling, tuition and automobiles. R.P.73,L.10-17. 
Despite Sherrie's allegation in August of 1994 that her 
condition prevented her from working, she in fact was employed at 
her same job until March of 1996 (R.P.92,L.10), some two (2) years 
after the onset of her arthritis. Nevertheless, Sherrie obtained 
her temporary alimony of $800.00 per month in May of 1995. 
Furthermore, one reason given for Sherrie's job termination was 
because her 'employer believed she was manipulating time sheets 
(R.P.60,L.24 & 25, R.P.61,L.1-6) and not because of her arthritic 
condition. 
Nevertheless, with apparently full knowledge of her medical 
condition, Sherrie voluntarily placed a second mortgage on her home 
in December of 1994. (R.P.67,L.21, R.P.68,L.11). Furthermore, even 
at trial, with no employment for at least one (1) year with just an 
alimony of $800.00 per month, Sherrie was able to remain current on 
that second mortgage debt and was not being legally pursued by 
creditors. (R.P.68,L.21-25). 
Lynn, pursuant to all prior Court orders of payment, was 
current in all his obligations to pay alimony to Sherrie. (R.P.133, 
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L.21-25/ R.P.134,L.l & 2.) 
Nothing in the record indicates that Lynn ever did anything to 
cause Sherrie's economic or medical condition. Thus, it is an 
inescapable conclusion that no extenuating circumstances exist that 
would justify imposing additional alimony obligations upon Lynn. 
Lynn's only "fault" was becoming financially successful after the 
divorce. 
ARGUMENT 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED AN ATTEMPT BY SHERRIE 
TO PRESENT FACTS AND EXHIBITS CONCERNING ISSUES THAT MAY 
HAVE EXISTED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE DIVORCE. 
Lynn presented to the trial court a Motion in Limine seeking 
to prevent Sherrie from re-opening and presenting evidence on 
matters existing prior to the Decree. She alleged, in her Amended 
Petition that Lynn orchestrated the divorce and in such a manner as 
to deprive Sherrie of her legitimate share of the marital estate. 
The trial court properly granted Lynn's Motion in Limine, The case 
of Jacobsen v. Jacobsen 703 P.2d (Utah 1985) held: "When there has 
been an adjudication it becomes res judicata as to those issues 
which were either tried and determined or upon all issues which the 
parties' had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in 
other proceedings." Accord, Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 
121 (Utah App 1988.) 
Sherrie now raises allegations of Lynn's alleged deceit in 
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this second petition to modify, but did not do so in her 1992 
Petition to Modify. Furthermore Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires definite time limits be adhered to in attempting 
to set aside a judgment or an independent action for fraud upon the 
Court. None of Sherrie's pleadings conformed to the requirements 
imposed by Rule 60(b). 
Sherrie's evidence at trial was properly limited to 
circumstances occurring from the last order of modification. After 
hearing all the evidence, the Court found that Sherrie's arthritic 
condition was a material change of circumstance that did not exist 
at the time of the entry of the Decree and that Lynn had the 
ability to pay the requested increase of alimony. However, 
Sherrie's Petition to Modify was, untimely filed and, therefore, 
properly dismissed. 
Interestingly, Sherrie, while arguing the "new" May 1, 1995 
Amendments to UCA 30-3-5 do not apply to this case, tried to argue 
the "new" 30-3-5 (7)(i) which provides that when a long marriage 
dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one 
of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change 
shall be considered in determining the amount of alimony. 
R.P.15,L.22-25, P.16,L.1-5. See trial brief of Sherrie Wilde, at 
P.13. 
Of course, upon Res judicata grounds, the Court disallowed 
this inquiry. Furthermore a detailed reading of this amendment 
seems to apply to a Trial Court's analysis to original divorce 
cases but not to petitions to modify. 
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CONCLUSION 
Lynn does not dispute that Sherrie contracted rheumatoid 
arthritis in approximately May of 1994. Nor does he dispute that 
Sherrie was unemployed at the time of trial. Rather, Lynn's 
position is that Sherrie's petition for a second increase of 
alimony was not timely filed. Any relief Sherrie wanted from the 
Court should have been filed prior to May of 1994. Sherrie's 
alimony award cannot arise from the grave of Lazarus. Throughout 
the law, time limitations and constraints are placed upon all 
litigants. Changes of circumstances, no matter how meritorious 
cannot justify creating an exception to these limitations where the 
ex-husband is not a causal factor in the change of circumstance. 
The policy of the law and the time limits for taking action 
indicates the desire and need for finality. The burden was on 
Sherrie both in 1992 and prior to May of 1994 to Petition the Court 
for the relief she now seeks. She did not meet this burden. The 
judgment of the trial court in dismissing Sherrie's Complaint 
should be affirmed and Lynn should be awarded all costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this /(O day of : ^ , 1998. 
KMTTTYAJIO 
Attorney fo^Respondent, 
J. Lynn Wilde 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE /> O / 
I certify that on the / fo day of ^ ^^^ / 1998 a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Respondent/s ^ rief was mailed via 
U.S. Mail to the following: 
Douglas G. Mortensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
'RENT T.(^ANO 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
Contents of Addendum 
June 5, 1987 Decree of Divorce; 
Stipulation to Modify Decree, June 3, 1992; 
Family Law in Utah, Pages 149,150; 
See Addendum to Appellant's Brief for the following: 
a. June 24, 1992 Modified Decree of Divorce. 
b. August 23, 1994 Verified Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce. 
c. January 24, 1996 Amended Petition to Modify Decree. 
d. March 25, 1997 Judge Henriod's Minute Entry Decision. 
e. April 17, 1997 Order on Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
f. UCA Section 30-3-5 (in effect prior to May 1, 1995). 
g. UCA Section 30-3-5 (effective May 1, 1995). 
Family Law in Utah; 
Excerpts, pages 149,150. 
Trial Brief of Defendant Sherrie D. Wilde. 
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ADDENDUM 
THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR. [A3611] 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
7001 South 900 E a s t , S u i t e 340 
M i d v a l e , UT 84047 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 562-5555 
FILED IN Clu-HK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUN 5 1987 
H. Dixon Hindle^Cler* 3rd OJaf. C< l p dley,7 ler>t 0 > 1 ourt 
Deputy Qi('< 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. LYNN WILDE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERRIE D. WILDE, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No.(fb86-oT92i^ 
Civil No. D86-03984 
The above entitled matter came up for hearing before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, one of the judges of the above 
entitled court, at the hour of 4:30 p.m. on the 28th day of 
May, 1987. 
Plaintiff was present along with his attorney, George E. 
Brown, Jr. Defendant was present, and was represented by her 
attorney, Richard Nemelka. 
The parties stipulated in open court before the judge to the 
terms of this divorce. Following the stipulation of the 
parties, the defendant was excused and the plaintiff was placed 
under oath and gave testimony. Based upon the stipulation of 
the parties and the testimony of the'•plaintiff the Court now 
enters its Decree of Divorce. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce to become 
final upon entry. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are bona fide residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three 
months prior to the commencement of this action. 
3. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, having 
been married at Salt Lake City, UT, on the 26th day of June, 
1963, 
4. Five children have been born as issue of this marriage, 
to-wit: Three children have reached the age of majority and 
left the home. Two minor children are left in the home: 
Michael Andrew Wilde, born April 18, 1975; and Christopher Paul 
Wilde, born July 27, 1977. Defendant is awarded the sole care, 
custody and control of the minor children, subject to liberal 
rights of visitation in plaintiff. 
5. During the course of the marriage defendant has treated 
plaintiff cruelly, causing him great mental distress and 
suffering and making continuation of the marriage relationship 
impossible. 
6. During the course of the marriage the parties have 
acquired an interest in certain real property, towit: the real 
property and residence located at 2590 Sundance Drive, Sandy, UT 
84092. Defendant is awarded the ownership and possession of 
said real property and residence and receive all equity therein 
and that defendant have possession until the lienholders require 
defendant to vacate the premises. 
1. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
acquired certain items of personal property. The personal 
property of the parties is awarded as follows: 
2 
a. To the plaintiff: The pool table, the motorcycle, 
his own personal clothes, his tools, his tennis racquet, his 
bowling ball, his own personal effects and belongings, and 
any interest in his automobile provided by his employer, 
b. To the defendant: All personal property of the 
parties not specifically listed above in paragraph 6a and 
including a 1986 Hyundai automobile, 
8. During the course of the marriage, the parties have 
incurred certain debts and obligations. The plaintiff is 
ordered to hold harmless and indemnify the defendant pertaining 
to all debts on the real property, including mortgages of the 
parties and all taxes, 
9. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant the sum of 
$250.00 per month per child for a total of $500.00 per month as 
child support for the benefit of the parties' minor children 
until such time as each child shall attain the age of 18 years 
or graduate from high school, whichever event shall last occur. 
In the event that plaintiff is delinquent in payment of child 
support, it shall be appropriate for the defendant to utilize 
the provisions of UCA, Title 78, Chapter 45d in order to collect 
delinquent child support through appropriate income withholding 
procedures. 
10. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of 
$200.00 per month as and for alimony for seven (7) years, or 
until the defendant remarries or any other event occurs which 
pursuant to law would terminate alimony, including the death of 
the defendant. 
3 
11. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain a comprehensive policy 
of health and accident insurance for the benefit of the parties ' 
minor children until such time as each child shall attain the 
age of 18 years or graduate from high school, whichever event 
shall last occur if the plaintiff can obtain the insurance at a 
reasonable cost. Any medical expenses incurred in behalf of the 
minor children such as dental, optical, orthodontics, 
deductibles, or other costs not covered by such insurance shall 
be borne equally by the plaintiff and the defendant. 
12. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain a policy of insurance 
on his life in the face amount of $50,000.00, naming the 
parties' minor children as the sole, irrevocable beneficiaries 
until such time as each child shall attain the age of 18 years 
or graduate from high school, whichever event shall last occur. 
13. Plaintiff is ordered to pay $600.00 to defendant for 
her expenses incurred for attorney's fees. 
14. Plaintiff shall be able to claim the two minor children 
of the parties as tax exemptions until the defendant makes 
$6,000.00 in taxable income per year, at which time the 
defendant shall be able to claim one child as a tax deduction 
and at such time as the defendant makes $9,000.00 taxable income 
per year, she shall be able to claim both minor children as tax 
deductions. 
15. Plaintiff and defendant are ordered to sign all 
documents necessary to effect the terms of this divorce. 
16. It is ordered that Case No. D86-3984 be consolidated 
4 
i n t o Case No. D86-03929 and t h a t t h i s Decree of Divorce be 
c o n t r o l l i n g i n bo th Qases . 
DATED t h i s _JT_ d^y
 Qf Way f 1987. 
[entoeth. Rigt rupTj 
) i s i t r i c t Cour t Q/u 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
dge 
H. DIXON h':N 
CL-i £RK 
< ^ & 
Hc-rytr; P.V.»r{( 
7 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy, 
postage prepaid, of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
and Decree of Divorc^ in the above matter on the rf] day of 
1987, to the following individual: 
Richard Nemelka 
Attorney for Defendant 
2046 East 4800 South #103 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
o 
Law 
May, 
I CERTIFY TOT THIS 15 A J ? ^ JWV OF { J 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT 0" ' ^ - t W J J J ™ * ° 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE C0UKT>, STAT 
DATE to|ll|j7 
— O ^ :^ERT 
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ADDENDUM 
STIPULATION RESOLVING THE FIRST PETITION TO MODIFY 
GEORGE E. BROWN, JR. [A3611] 
7001 South 900 East, Suite 250 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 562-5555 
Attorney for Plaintiff J. Lynn Wilde 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. LYNN WILDE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
SHERRIE D. WILDE 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 86-4903929 
Judge Rigtrup 
Plaintiff, individually and by and through his attorney, 
George E. Brown, Jr., and Defendant, individually, and by and 
through her attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, hereby agree and 
stipulate as follows: 
1. That effective June 1, 1992, the Decree of Divorce may 
be ammended and modified pursuant to the terms of this 
Stipulation with all other provisions of the Decree not referred 
to herein to remain in full force and effect. 
2. That the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant child 
support in the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars 
($1,200.00) per month for the two minor children to begin in the 
month of June, 1992, until the two minor children reach the age 
of 18 or their normal high school class graduates, whichever 
occurs last. 
3. That the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant alimony 
in the sum of Three Hundred Eighteen Dollars ($318.00) per month 
to begin in June, 1992, until it terminates in May, 1994, but 
the Defendant shall only be required to pay a total of One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) per month towards 
child support and alimony and the Eighteen Dollars ($18.00) of 
alimony per month for 24 months for a total of Four Hundred 
Thirty Two Dollars ($432.00) shall accrue to be paid at such 
time when the child support obligation is decreased based upon 
one of the children reaching the age of 18 or his normal school 
class graduating from high school whichever occurs last. 
4. That the Defendant shall be awarded judgment for the 
sura of Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Nine Dollars and 
Twenty Cents ($8,179.20) with interest accruing thereon at the 
rate of eight percent (8%) per annum. Said amount represents 
the increase in child support retroactive back to June, 1991, 
the date the Petition was filed by the Defendant, for a total of 
12 months at the sum of Six Hundred Eighty One Dollars and Sixty 
Cents ($681.60) per month. Further, the Defendant shall be 
stayed from executing upon said judgment as long as the 
Plaintiff pays to the Defendant the sum of $1,500.00 per month. 
Said judgment shall be satisfied by the Plaintiff continuing to 
pay the sum of $1,500.00 per month after the child support 
monthly payments are reduced based upon the oldest child reaches 
the age of 18 or his normal high school class graduates, 
whichever occurs last. That said $1,500.00 per month payments 
shall continue until the aforementioned judgment, including 
2 
accrued interest and the accrued alimony of $18,00 per month for 
24 months have been paid in full. 
5. Based upon the Stipulation of the parties that the 
Plaintiff will pay $1,200.00 per month in child support for the 
two minor children; $318.00 per month for alimony, ($18.00 per 
month accruing for 24 months for a total of $432.00); and 
retroactive child support in the amount of $8,179.20 at 8% 
interest; the Plaintiff will pay $1,500.00 per month in child 
support and alimony through September, 1994. In October of 
1994, the Plaintiff will pay $104.26 representing the final 
payment on the retroactive child support and accrued interest, 
$432.00 representing the accrued alimony, and $698.00 
representing the child support on the minor child, Christopher, 
for a total of $1,130.00. In November, 1994, the Plaintiff will 
pay the Defendant $698.00 in child support for the minor child, 
Christopher. The payment of $698.00 shall continue through 
July, 1995 when Christopher reaches the age of 18 which is after 
his normal high school class has graduated. 
6. That the Defendant shall be awarded judgment against 
the Plaintiff for the sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) in 
attorney's fees to be paid at Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per 
month beginning June, 1992, with the same accruing interest at 
the rate of 12% per annum. 
7. That the Plaintiff shall be allowed to claim the minor 
child, Christopher, as a dependent for income tax purposes. 
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Defendant shall sign any and all documents necessary to meet 
Internal Revenue Service requirements for the Plaintiff to take 
the tax exemption. 
8. That the Plaintiff shall pay 70% of all medical, 
dental, orthodontic, optical and therapeutic expenses incurred 
on behalf of the minor children that are not covered by 
insurance. The Defendant shall pay 30% of all medical expenses 
not covered by insurance. 
9. That all child support and alimony payments shall be 
paid one-half (1/2) by the 5th and one-half (1/2) by the 20th of 
each month. 
10. That in the event the Plaintiff is more than thirty 
days (30) in arrears in the payment of any child support or 
alimony payment that the Defendant shall be entitled to a wage 
and withholding order pursuant to statute. 
DATED t h i s J> day of 
17 
Sfe '•ft , 1 9 9 2 . 
SHERRIE D. WILDE, Defendant 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Defendant 
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conditioned on the performance by defendant of paying the agreed 
liabilities. When defendant willfully avoided his required performance 
through bankruptcy, he failed to perform the condition precedent.491 
Failure of a material condition precedent relieves the other party of any 
obligation to perform.492 The stipulated agreement will not be enforceable 
against plaintiff. The court should look to the present condition and needs 
of the parties and modify its order if necessary.493 
Interestingly, 30-3-5 (7) (g)(ii) added that the court may not modify 
alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient 
that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action. Presumably, the 
legislature decided that subsequent illnesses, accidents, mishaps or bad luck 
should not be the responsibility of the previous spouse without a showing 
of extenuating circumstances justifying imposing the responsibility on the 
spouse. 
R. Modifications that Extend Alimony for a Period Longer 
than the Duration of the Marriage 
p Code 
30-3-5(7) (h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that 
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
I extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the 
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that 
justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. This puts a 
further restriction on modification by requiring that modification for a 
period of time longer than the number of years the marriage lasted must 
occur, if at all, prior to termination. 
See, e.g., Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 212-13 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210,213 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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This creates a trap for unwary practitioners. Prior to passage of 
§ 30-3-5(7)(h), the Supreme Court had held that a wife in her mid-fifties, 
with little or no work experience, should be awarded permanent alimony. 
Now, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances to the contrary, she 
will be awarded alimony for a duration equal to or less than the length of 
the marriage. A twenty year marriage could result in a twenty year 
alimony award. This seems fair, but if the recipient spouse whose only 
support is alimony lives longer than age 75 (age 55 plus 20 yrs.), her only 
source of income will cut out. 
In addition, women who are the same age and who have the same 
work experience could get vastly different treatment simply because they 
have been married for different lengths of time. Practitioners who fail to 
ask for a finding justifying permanent alimony will do their clients a grave 
disservice. 
A modification can be obtained provided that the recipient 
discovers the problem before the alimony terminates. If the two women 
in the previous paragraph were neighbors and happened to discover the 
problem together, one may be barred (because she did not seek 
modification before the previous award terminates) and the other able to 
modify her alimony award. 
S. Termination Upon Remarriage 
i- Code 
30-3-5(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that 
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that 
former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ah initio, payment 
of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment 
and his rights are determined. 
Prior to 1995, in reinstating alimony after an annulment, the courts 
relied on the language of § 30-3-5(3) which read: "The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties." In 1995, this section was renumbered 
30-3-5 (7) (g), and the language was changed to: 
(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-2244 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
J. LYNN WILDE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHERRIE D. WILDE, 
Defendant. 
TRIAL BRIEF 
OF DEFENDANT 
SHERRIE D.WILDE 
Civil No. 864903929DA 
Judge Stephen Henriod 
In support of her Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, defendant Sherrie D. 
Wilde submits this trial brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
J. Lynn Wilde ("Lynn") and Sherrie D. Wilde ("Sherrie") were married to each other 
for 25 years. Their union produced five children, all of whom are now adults. The parties 
were divorced on June 8, 1987. 
One month after their divorce, Lynnfs debts were discharged in bankruptcy. 
Thereafter, a business with which Lynn had been affiliated for several years - Beneficial 
hitemational - rapidly prospered. Lynn began to enjoy great wealth. Later, Sherrie's health 
began to deteriorate. In the spring of 1994, her health was suddenly and seriously 
compromised by what was thereafter diagnosed as rheumatoid arthritis. Since then, her 
condition has worsened dramatically and she is no longer able to maintain gainful 
employment At present, her monthly expenses far exceed Lynn's alimony obligation to her 
and she is dependent upon Welfare assistance from the LDS Church to maintain herself. 
In this action, Sherrie seeks an increase in alimony and an Order making such alimony 
permanent. In addition, Sherrie asks that the divorce decree be modified to award her a 
reasonable, equitable share of assets acquired by Lynn as a result of profit-motivated, wealth-
building efforts expended by him during the marriage. Sherrie also seeks to recover the costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees she has incurred in this action, 
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS 
June 26* 1962* The parties married in the Salt Lake LDS Temple. During the 
ensuing 14 years, Sheme gave birth to five children. 
May 6,1985; Lynn files a petition for individual banloruptcy (Case No. 85A-01481). 
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May 28,1986: Lynn's Chapter 13 bankruptcy action is dismissed. 
August 1, 1986; Lynn files a new Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, Case 
No. 86A-02705-JHA. 
September 29, 1986: Lynn files for divorce from Sherrie. 
June 8, 1987: The parties' divorce decree is entered, terminating their 25 year 
marriage. 
July 8,1987: All of Lynn's debts are discharged through his bankruptcy action. 
June 24,1992: Divorce decree is modified. 
August 23,1994: Sherrie files petition to modify alleging material and substantial 
changes in circumstances since the June 1992 decree modification, including a substantial 
increase in Lynn's income; a substantial decrease in Sherries income; Sherrie's contraction 
of rheumatoid arthritis, resulting in substantial increase in her monthly expenses and a 
decrease in her capacity to maintain gainful employment. Her petition seeks "additional 
alimony on a permanent basis or until she is able to retrain herself for another employment". 
May 1,1995: Commissioner Arnett issues Minute Entry recommending that Lynn 
be required to pay Shenie $800.00 per month in temporary alimony during the pendency of 
her petition to modify to the decree. Lynn objects to the recommendation and the matter 
goes to Judge Rigtrup. 
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September 29,1995: Judge Rigtrup issues Minute Entry adopting Commissioner 
Arnett's recommendation. His Minute Entry states, inter alia: 
The Court has considered the long duration of the marriage, the 
medical needs and health limitations of defendant and the large 
disparity of the incomes of the parties. . . . [I]t is clear to the 
Court that defendant has demonstrated needs she is incapable of 
meeting on her own. There is an identifiable tax benefit through 
the payment of alimony which lessens the actual burden to the 
obligor. Plaintiff as a principal in Beneficial International, Inc., 
is in a position to enjoy prerequisites of employment which 
effectively enhance his real income. Plaintiff is in a better 
position than defendant to exploit creative juggling in managing 
his personal finances 
October 5, 1995; Formal order reflecting Judge Rigtrup's ruling is signed and 
entered. It expressly states that the decision to grant $800.00 per month temporary alimony 
effective March 1, 1995 "shall in no way interfere with the trial court's discretion to make 
any percnanent modification retroactive to the time of sendee of the petition to modify." 
November 1, 1995: Sherrie seeks leave to amend her petition to include the 
allegation that she may be entitled to an equitable share of Lynn's present wealth due to its 
having originated in efforts expended by him during the marriage. Sherrie's proposed 
amended petition alleges that Lynn did substantial groundwork for amassing his present 
assets while he was married to her and that he minimized his earnings then in order to reduce 
his marital obligation and burdens. She further alleges this enabled him to thereafter 
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accelerate the fruition of the wealth-building plans formulated and put into action during his 
marriage to her. Her request to modify is based on part on her receipt of an unsigned, 
typewritten note suggesting inquiry into Lynn's assets. The note, placed in her mailbox, 
stated: 
Multi-million dollar public corp. controlling interest and stock 
owned by partnership - did not have at time of divorce. 
Bankrupt? So, when did he get stock? How? If he purchased 
it where did he get the money, and when? If it was given to 
him, did he claim it on taxes? 
After receiving this note, Sherrie caused her counsel to conduct investigation which led her 
to beheve that Lynn orchestrated his divorce and bankruptcy actions in a manner to deprive 
her of a share of his interest in stock in Beneficial International and other related business 
entities. 
January 29,1996: This Court grants Shenie's motion for leave to amend her petition 
to modify. 
July 3,1996: Sherrie files certification of readiness for trial. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
L Has there been a substantial change of circumstances warranting an increase 
in the amount and duration of alimony? 
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2. Does Sherrie have financial needs she is unable to meet? 
3. Does Lynn have the ability to meet Sherrie's financial needs? 
4. Should the divorce decree be modified to award Sherrie a reasonable, equitable 
share of assets and wealth acquired by Lynn as a result of efforts expended during the parties' 
marriage? 
GERMANE FACTS 
During the first 20 years of their marriage, the parties enjoyed a favorable lifestyle 
and standard of living. They purchased their first home within a couple of years after their 
marriage. Their second home was built specially for them in the Willow Creek area. They 
later moved from that home into another home in the Willow Creek area which had been one 
of the Home Show homes. 
During their marriage, the parries vacationed in Hawaii, California, Las Vegas and 
St. George. They took their family to St George at Easter every year for a 1 week vacation. 
They went to Disneyland. They stayed several times at Vacation Village in Southern 
California. Each of their children was given a car when he or she reached driving age. Each 
was awarded a vacation trip for high school graduation. Two of their sons were taken to 
Hawaii, one with a friend. Lynn paid for their daughter's graduation trip to the Virgin Islands 
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with heT friends. The parties1 daughter took piano and dancing lessons. Their sons played 
tennis and golf. All of their children skied and owned ski equipment 
Four years after the parties married, Lynn received his Bachelors Degree from the 
University of Utah in Fine Arts. He worked in commercial ait, designing and constructing 
electric signs. For approximately 10 years, he owned his own sign company. In 1979, he 
co-founded Western Heritage Thrift and Loan, In 1982, his employment with Western 
Heritage was terminated. From that time until he filed for divorce in September of 1986, 
Lynn Wilde's reported income was considerably less than it had been during the first 20 
years of the parties marriage. 
Shortly after leaving Western Heritage, Lynn became affiliated with Beneficial 
International, a health and beauty products company. He traveled extensively, appearing at 
trade shows. He was given a substantial block of stock in the company and in time became 
one of its two principals. He has been a director of the company since at least 1984 - three 
years before his divorce was entered. 
The condition of the company and the value of his interest in it at the time of the 
divorce is not clear. What is clear, however, is that shortly after the divorce was finalized 
and Lynn's debts were discharged in bankruptcy, die business began prospering. Its 
prosperity has increased steadily since the mid-1980's. 
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Audited financial statements of Beneficial International reflect a near phenomenal 
growth in prosperity, including these figures for recent financial years ending January 31: 
YEARS 
1990 
1991 
| 1992 
1 1.993 
| 1994 
, 1995 
| 1996 
TOTAL 
ASSETS 
$400,291.00 
$467,922.00 
$1,246,598.00 
$1,209,513.00 
$1,247,850.00 
, $1,480,267.00 
! $1,547,195.00 
RETAINED 
EARNINGS 
$150,650.00 
$245,806.00 j 
$563,088.00 1 
$615,882.00 
$817,329.00 
, $707,824.00 , 
l_ $878,972.00 
Lynn Wilde is the president and chief executive officer of Beneficial International. 
The company owns a large huilding and warehouse comprising 28,000 square feet in Salt 
Lake. The assessed value of the property is $460,900. The company is the parent 
corporation of several wholly owned subsidiaries. Lynn holds some 4,554,793 shares of 
stock in Beneficial International. The corporation is publicly held and listed with NASDAQ. 
Its shares have traded within the last year for 7 0 a share. Lynn's stock (comprising 27% of 
the outstanding shares of the company) at that price would have a value of $318,836.00. 
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Lynn earns a monthly salary of $8,770.00. His 1996 W-2 income was $112,617.00. 
In addition to his take home draws and bonuses, he is provided a vehicle (Mercedes) and his 
transportation and car insurance expenses are paid by the company. He also enjoys full 
health benefits, through the company. He owns and lives in a condominium in Bountiful 
having an appraised value, as of last year, of $236,000. It contains a hot tub, sauna, big 
screen TV, two other TVs and two VCRTs. In July of 1995, Lynn purchased a lot in North 
Salt Lake for $97,000 in cash. He intends to build a home on that lot. Last Christmas, he 
took 8 people to Hawaii for a week vacation. 
In contrast, Sherrie has become financially destitute. Due to a dramatic worsening 
of her rheumatoid arthritis, Sherrie has been unable to work, even part time. She is at present 
unemployed, uninsured and uninsurable. Her monthly medical expenses exceed $800.00. 
They are likely to increase. She has received food from the Bishop's Storehouse of the LDS 
Church. Since January of 1996, some $9,907.00 of her other living expenses (mortgage 
obligations, utility payments, etc.) have been paid by her bishop through her ward's welfare 
program since January 1996 alone. 
Contending that Sherrie is not as ill or debilitated as she claims, Lynn demanded an 
independent medical exam. The independent physician he selected was Dr. W. Patrick 
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Knibbe. Dr. Knibbe examined Shenie in January of 1996. His January 19, 1996 medical 
report states: 
This patient has uncontrolled rheumatoid arthritis . . . which 
bodes poorly for her ultimate prognosis . . . . The outlook for 
her health related expenses is that she is likely to require surgery 
on her feet, knees and hands eventually and currently she is 
limiting her prescription drug use based on the expense involved 
with these medications.... 
I would advocate financial support in the form of health 
insurance for this patient as a bare niinimum of support if at all 
possible. Other ancillary services such as occupational therapy, 
physical therapy or orthotics, hand splints, and a regular 
exercise program are all part of a good program of treatment of 
rheumatoid arthritis and these are services this patient cannot 
afford at this point. 
(See Exhibit A attached to Shenie Wilde's April 15,1996 Affidavit herein). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
REVISED § 30-3-5(7)(g) DOES NOT APPLY TO 
SHERRIE'S REQUEST FOR INCREASED, EXTENDED 
ALIMONY. EVEN IF IT DID, IT WOULD NOT BAR 
SHERRIES CLAIM. 
In 1995, the Utah Legislature revised portions of Chapter 3, Title 30 of the Utah 
Code. Hie revisions became effective May 1,1995. They included § 30-3-5(7)(g)(ii) which 
provides: 
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The Court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the 
time the decree was entered, unless the Court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action,1 
Lynn contends that this provision precludes this court from increasing or extending 
the duration of Sherrie's alimony. 
Lynn argues that because Sherrie's pending petition to modify was amended after May 
1, 1995, this statute applies. This contention is erroneous because the amendment to 
Shenie's petition to modify does not concern alimony. It concerns redistribution of property 
and a claim against Lynn's post divorce accumulation of wealth based on his wealth-building 
efforts during the inaiiiage. The cited revised subsection of § 30-3-5 concerns alimony only 
and has no impact on this claim. 
Although Shenie's amended petition does reassert her claim for alimony, the relation 
back doctrine of Rule 15(c) expressly preserves that claim as relating back to Hie date of the 
filing of her original petition to modify (August 19, 1994): 
Whenever the claim... asserted in the amended pleading arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
The intended meaning of this subsection is difficult to discern• The 
immediately preceding subsection states almost its apposite: 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances 
not foreseeable at the time o£ the divorce. 
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attempted to be set forth in the original pleading the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
Rule 15(c), URCP. 
Even if the recently revised version of § 30-3-5(7)(g) did apply, it would not defeat 
Sheme's alimony claim. This section does not preclude an increase in the amount or 
duration of alimony to address needs that did not exist at the time of the divorce. It merely 
provides that such increase must be based on a finding of "extenuating circumstances". If 
Sherrie's situation does not present "extenuating circumstances", no situation does. Her 
circumstances are extenuated in the extreme. 
The version of § 30-3-5 in effect at the time the parties were divorced contained the 
following provision as Subsection 3: 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the 
parties . . . or the distribution of the property . . . as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(See Exhibit A, attached) 
This Court has full diccretionary power and authority to make whatever changes or 
new orders it considers reasonable and necessary concerning alimony and distribution of 
property. 
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n. 
ALTHOUGH THE NEW STATUTORY REVISIONS DO 
NOT APPLY TO SHERRIES ALIMONY CLAIM 
(ASSERTED BEFORE THE AMENDMENTS BECAME 
EFFECTIVE), THEY DO APPLY TO HER PROPERTY 
DISTRIBUTION CLAIM (FIRST ASSERTED AFTER 
THE AMENDMENTS). 
The recent revisions to §30-3-5 include a revised subsection (e). That subsection 
states: 
When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of 
a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the 
collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in 
dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of 
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been gTeatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the 
marriage, the Court may make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
This subsection like the rest of the revisions, became effective on May 1, 1995. It 
applies to Sherrie's request for a compensating adjustment in the property division because 
she first attempted to assert that claim on November 1, 1995 - 6 months after the statute 
became effective. The court granted her leave to add that claim to her petition to modify on 
January 29, 1996. 
The Wilde marriage was a marriage of long duration - 25 years. It "dissolved" on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of Lynn Wilde. During the marriage, the parties 
endured great financial hardships while Lynn undertook to build the business which 
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gradually brought him great, increasing prosperity. His present wealth is a result of the 
groundwork he laid during the last several years of his marriage. During those years, the 
Wilde family experienced financial difficulties they never had previously known. Lynn's 
having received a discharge of his debts in bankraptcy simultaneous with the dissolution of 
his marriage attests to his having achieved a fresh financial start. The prosperity that 
followed was a result of his efforts during his marriage to Sherrie. Sherrie should be granted 
a share of the wealth resulting from his industry during the marriage. Lynn's wealth-building 
efforts during the last few years of the marriage occasioned sacrifices and hardship to 
Sherrie. 
Tf the other revision applies, this one likewise applies. It is expressly supportive of 
the claim Sherrie seeks to assert. 
DATED MsjtO day of March, 1997. 
v
 Douelas^j. Moi gl s ?. rtensen 
MATHESON, MORTpkSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
- 14 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 20th day of March, 1997 a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
was sent via facsimile and hand delivered to the following: 
Kent T. Yano - fax no. 277-7334 
2225 East 4800 South, #109 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Wilde\Trialbrf.def 
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CHAPTER 257 
H-B. No. 125 
passed February 25,1991 
Approved March 18, 1991 
Effective April 29, 1991 
CREDIT OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES 
By David M. Jones 
x. <cTtU5LATJXGTODJVOHCEAWDSEPA-
UXTE MAINTENANCE? PROVIDING FOR 
THE DIVISION OF DEBTS AND OBLIGA-
TONS OF THE PARTIES; CLARIFYING 
rERTAJN RIGHTS AND DUTIES: AND 
VtAKlNG TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
r H IS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS; 
tr* i UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
;1 J-V AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 72 
' AND 100, LAWS OF UTAH 1985 
, , . 4 ^ AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 1*2, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1977 
ENACTS: 
i/i-4-6.5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
REPEALS AND REENACTS; 
;M^2-5. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
IU> it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 1^-4-1. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, ia amended to read: 
j 5-4-1. Definitions. 
*urtedj: 
(1) "Obligation* includes a liability in tort andcor^ 
vractual obligations; [^bliejw^-tncludco a porao*v4i-
(2) "obligee" includes a creditor and a person hav-
ing a right based on a tort; 
13 > "obligor* includes a debtor and a person liable 
for a tort; 
i'4» Several obligors" mean3 obligors severity 
bound for the same performance. 
Section 2. Section Enacted* 
Section 15-4-6.5. Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
enacted to read: 
15-4-6.5, Divorce or separate maintenance: of 
coobligors* 
< 1) Qji the entering of a decree of divorce or sepa-
rate maintenance of joint debtors in contractTtKe 
claim of a creditor remains unchanged unless otlieT 
wise provided by the contract or until a new contract 
>s entered into between the creditor and the debtors 
moTviduaily ' ~ — ~~ 
< 2t In addition to his duties as a secured party^un-
der Section 70A-9-U2 and his duties afc a trustee or 
beneficiary of a tniBt deed under Chapter 1, Title 57, 
Conveyances, a creditor, who has been notified by 
service of a copy of a c»urt order under Sections 
30-3-5 or 30-4-3 thai the debtors are divorced or 
living separately under an order for separate main* 
tenance, and wno has been expressly advised of the 
separate, current addresses of the debtors either by 
the court order orbyjther written notice, shall pro* 
vla'e to the debtors individually all statements, no-
tices, and other similar correspondence required by 
law or by the contract. 
(3Ha) Except as provided in Subsection (bK acred-
iter may continue to make negative credit reports of 
joint debtors under SectionTOC-7-107 and may re-
port the repayment practices or credit history of 
joint debtors under Chapter 14> Title 7, Credit Infor^  
mation Exchange. 
(b) With respect to a debtor who is not ordered by 
the court under Sections 30-3-5 or 30-4-3 to make 
paymente on a joint obligation, no negative credit 
report under Section 7QC~7-1Q7, and no report of 
the debtor's repayment practices or credit history 
under Chapter 14. Title 7, Credit Information Ex-
change, may be made regarding the joint obligation 
aftertrTe creditor is served notice of the court's order 
as required under Subsection (2), unless the crectT 
tor hag made a demand on the"5ebtor for payment 
because of the failure to make payments by the otiv 
er debtor, who is ordered by the court to make trie 
payments. 
Section 3. Section Repealed and Reenactcd. 
Section 30-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is re-
pealed and reenacted to read: 
30-2-6. Separate debts* 
(1) Neither Bpou&e ie personally liable for the sep-
arate debts,obligations, or liabilities of the other: 
(a) contracted or incurred before marriage; 
(b) contracted or incurred during marriage, ex-
cept family expenses as provided in Section 30-2-9; 
(c) contracted or incurred after divorce or an order 
for separate maintenance under this title; or 
(d) ordered by the court to be paid by the other 
spouse under Section 30-3-5 or 30-4-3 and not m 
conflict with Section 15-4-6,5, 
(2) The wages, earnings, property, rents, or other 
income of one spouse may not be reached by a credi-
tor of the other spouse to satisfy a debt, obligation, 
or liability of the other spouse, as described under 
Subsection (1). 
Section 4. Section Amended. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapters 72 and 100, Law? of Utah 
1985, is amended to read: 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Mainte-
nance and health care of parties and chil-
dren — Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing; jurisdiction — Custody and vis-
itation —• Termination of alimony — Non-
meritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree ofdivorc* is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
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The cou rt shall include the follow ing in every decree 
of divorce: 
<a) an order assigning responsibility for the pay-
ment of reasonable and necessary medical and den-
tai expenses of the dependent children; landl 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an 
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insur-
ance for the dependent chiidranlrj; and 
it) pursuant to Section 15-4-£-5: 
(\) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liaSili-
lies ofthe parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tivecrgditors or obligees, regarding the court's divi-
sion offlebts, obligations, QT liabilities and regard-
ing the parties' separate, current addressee; and 
(in) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determin-
ing child support, an order assigning financial re-
sponsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, neces-
sitated by the employment or training of the custo* 
dial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent 
children would be adequately cared for, it may in-
clude an order allowing the noncustodial parent to 
provide the day care for the dependent children, ne-
cessitated by the employment or training ofthe Cus-
todial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support 
and maintenance ofthe parties, the custody ofthe 
children and their support, maintenance, health, 
and dental carts, or the distribution ofthe property 
and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall 
consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order ofthe court that a party pay al-
imony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. Howev-
er, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void 
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order ofthe court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment 
by the party paying alimony that the former spouse 
is residing with a person ofthe opposite sex. Howev-
er, if it is further established by the pereon receiving 
alimony that that relationship or association is 
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony 
shall resume. 
(71 When a petition for modification of child custo-
dy or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to 
pay the reasonable attorney's Tees expended by the 
prevailing party in that action, if the court deter-
mines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted in good faith. 
Section 5» Section Amended. 
Section 30-4-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 122, Laws of Utah 1977, \n 
amended to read: 
30-4-3. Custody and maintenance of chil-
dren — Property and debt division — Sup-
port payments. 
(Jj In all actions brought [hefewderl under this 
chapter the court may by order or decree^ 
(a) provide for the care, custody, and maintenance 
ofThe minor children ofthe parties and may deter-
mine with which ofthe parties the children or any of 
them shall remain; [may awardtogtlhcrapouafrpefr 
session of any of-the-r^al or pcroonaV^atate-^f^he 
e^ he^ -apQuae, and decree moneys] 
(b) ii) provide for support of [that) either spouse 
and the support ofthe minor children [-and] remain" 
ing with that spouse; 
(ii) provide how and when support payments shall 
be madeH; and 
(iii) provide that either spouse have a lien upon 
the property ofthe other to secure payment ofthe 
[SQIDC. Such] support or maintenance obligation; 
(c) award to either spouse the possession of any 
real or personal property of the other Bpouse or ac-
quired by the spouses during the marriage; or 
(d) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) specify which party is responsible for the pay-
ment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities con-
tracted or incurred by the parties during the mar-
riage; 
(ii) require the parties to notify respective credi* 
tors" or obligees regarding the court's division of 
debts, obligations, and liabilities and regarding the 
parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provide for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The orders and decrees under this section may 
be enforced by sale of any property ofthe spouse or 
by contempt proceedings or otherwise as may be 
necessary. 
(3) The court may change the [allowance) support 
or maintenance of a party from time to time accord-
ing to circumstances, and may terminate altogether 
any fa44wanee-made) obligation upon satisfactory 
proof of voluntary and permanent reconciliation, 
i^iieh-allownnec) An order or decree of support or 
maintenance shall[rbeweve*d in every case be valid 
only during the joint lives ofthe husband and wife. 
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